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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joshua Miller appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress drug evidence
that was found in his pocket as the result of a police officer's warrantless detention and weapons
frisk, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. At the time he initiated the detention and the
search, the officer had no reason to suspect Mr. Miller of criminal activity, and no reason to
believe he was armed and presently dangerous. However, the district court invoked the doctrine
of inevitable discovery and decided that the exclusionary rule did not apply, and the court chose
not to decide the issue of whether the officer violated Mr. Miller's constitutional rights.
On appeal, Mr. Miller argues that the district court erred in its application of the
inevitable discovery doctrine in that the court based its decision on a hypothetical that was
speculative, not inevitable, and substituted alternative facts for what the officer actually did.
Additionally, because the State failed to carry its burden of demonstrating facts to justify the
officer's warrantless detention and search, this Court should reverse the district court's order
denying suppression and vacate Mr. Miller's conviction.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts were established at the suppression hearing. 1 On March 24, 2018,
Boise police officers were dispatched to a residence in response to a 911 call; a concerned family
member had reported that the woman inside sent him text messages threatening to hang herself
along with her young son. (R., p.73; Tr., p.10, Ls.2-5, p.21, Ls.5-13.) Officer Wayne Anderson
knocked on the front door, and when he received no answer he and another officer kicked it open

1

Officer Wayne Anderson testified, (see Tr., p.5 L,1 - p.44, L.7), and his bodycam video was
offered as State's Exhibit 1 ("Exhibit") and played at the hearing (Tr., p.9, Ls.3-20).
1

and loudly announced themselves as the police.

(R., p.73.)

The woman had already been

detained by officers who had entered through the back door, and Officer Anderson heard her say
she had been joking and that her son was not in danger. (R., p.73; Ex.01:45-55.) However,
because the woman did not immediately state where the boy was, Officer Anderson quickly
moved to the upstairs looking for the child. (R., p.73, Ls.4-7.) Once upstairs, Officer Anderson
observed a shadow moving at the doorway of the far bedroom, suggestive of a person swinging;
the officer approached the room expecting to fmd a body hanging. (Tr., p.13, Ls.12-25.)
When he entered the far bedroom, however, Officer Anderson found Mr. Miller sitting
calmly on a couch. (R., p.74; Tr., p.14, Ls.1-4; Ex.02:01-5.) Officer Anderson was surprised to
find an adult male in the house, and surprised to see him sitting; however, Officer Anderson did
not ask Mr. Miller about the welfare of the child, but instead stated, "You're not a child-what's
going on?" and promptly detained Mr. Miller in handcuffs and immediately conducted a pat
search for weapons. (R., p.74; Tr., p.23, Ls.13-17; Ex. 02:05-15.) As he conducted the pat
search, Officer Anderson felt what he believed to be a folded knife in Mr. Miller's front pants
pocket, and asked Mr. Miller "What is it?" and "Can I take it out?" (Tr., p.16, Ls.9-14; p.25,
Ls. I 0-22; Ex.02:20-30.) Mr. Miller verbally confirmed the item was a knife, but he denied the
officer permission to remove it. (R., p.74; Tr., p.16, Ls.14-23, p.25, Ls.10-22; Ex. 02:20-30.)
Officer Anderson then reached into Mr. Miller's pocket to take the knife, anyway. (R., p.74;
Tr., p.25,

Ls.10-16;

Ex.02:05-35.)

As the

officer removed the

knife,

a baggy of

methamphetamine came with it. (R., p.74; Tr., p.16, Ls.11-17; Ex.02:05-35.) At that point,
Officer Anderson told Mr. Miller he was under arrest and handed him over to the other officers
standing outside the door of the room; Mr. Miller was taken out to the waiting police cars.
(R., p.75; Tr., pp.19-21-24; Ex. 02:40-45.) Officer Anderson did not know Mr. Miller's name,
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and Mr. Miller refused to disclose his identity in response to the officers' requests at the scene.
(R., p.75; Tr., p.19, Ls.3-5, p.26, Ls.20-24.) After his arrest, the officers inside the residence
looked for evidence of Mr. Miller's identity, unsuccessfully. (Ex. 05:05-10.) Ultimately, about
fourteen minutes later, the officer who had taken Mr. Miller into custody was able to obtain his
identity;2 during the arrest process, an active parole warrant was discovered, and at some point,
Mr. Miller was arrested on the parole warrant. (R., p.75; Tr., p.19, L.20- p.20, L.13.)
Following his arrest of Mr. Miller and removing him from the bedroom, Officer
Anderson turned back to the room and had a good look around, scanning the area. (R., p.75;
Tr., p.27, Ls.12-18, p.28, Ls.1-8.) As he did, Officer Anderson observed, for the very first time,
obvious drug paraphernalia lying on the bed and marijuana in an open container near where
Mr. Miller had been sitting. (R., p.75; Tr., p.27, Ls.10-18, p.29, Ls.18-24; Ex.02:55-59.) The
district court found that Officer Anderson had not observed these items previously because the
officer had "tunnel vision" while Mr. Miller was in the room (R., p.74), and because his attention
was "consumed by" Mr. Miller's presence (R., p.80). Additionally, because he was so focused
on Mr. Miller, Officer Anderson had not heard that his fellow officers had already found the
child in the adjacent bedroom, which Officer Anderson had walked past. (R., p.80; Tr., p.31,
Ls.5-6.)
The State charged Mr. Miller with possession of methamphetamine and two
misdemeanor drug offenses. (R., pp.23-25.) Mr. Miller filed a motion to suppress the evidence,
arguing that his initial detention and weapons frisk by Officer Anderson violated his rights under
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, section 17, of the Idaho

2

The record does not indicate that this occurred at the scene; the identification may have been
obtained in transit, at the station house, or else where.
3

Constitution, and that suppression was required by the exclusionary rule. 3

(R., pp.39-50;

Tr., p.35, L.1 - p.36, L.17.)
The State opposed the motion, arguing Officer Anderson's actions were constitutionally
justified, and that even if they weren't and the methamphetamine evidence was unlawfully
obtained, the inevitable discovery doctrine precluded suppression because of the active parole
warrant. (R., pp.53-67.) The State argued that, "once law enforcement learned Mr. Miller's
identity, they would have been obligated to arrest him" and the methamphetamine would
inevitably have been discovered during the search incident to his arrest on that warrant.
(R., pp.45-49.) Mr. Miller filed a Reply brief arguing that the subsequent arrest on the parole
warrant did not save the illegally obtained evidence from suppression, framing the issue under
the attenuation doctrine. (R., pp.53-57.)4
The district court denied Mr. Miller's motion to suppress, invoking the doctrine of
inevitable discovery. However, the district court based its decision on a theory different from
that argued by the State; the district court concluded that discovery of the evidence in
Mr. Miller's pocket was inevitable because, had Officer Anderson not been consumed by
Mr. Miller's presence in the room, the officer would have noticed the drug contraband, arrested
Mr. Miller because of it, and then discovered the methamphetamine during the ensuing search
incident to that arrest. (R., pp.76-80.) As stated by the district court:

If Mr.

Miller had not been there, Officer Anderson would have conducted a
similar scan of the room that Officer Anderson conducted in the few second[ s]
after Mr. Miller was taken away, and discovered the paraphernalia. If Officer
Anderson had not handcuffed Mr. Miller and if Officer Anderson had not frisked

3

Mr. Miller did not claim that the warrantless entry of the residence violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.
4
The district court's statement that Mr. Miller's reply brief raised an issue regarding a Fourth
Amendment waiver is mistaken. (See R., p.79.) Neither party raised this issue. See State's Brief
In Opposition (R., pp.48-53), and Reply To State's Opposition (R., pp.56-60).
4

Mr. Miller and discovered the methamphetamine, in Mr. Miller's pocket, Officer
Anderson would inevitably have arrested Mr. Miller when Officer Anderson
identified the contraband near where Mr. Miller had been. The methamphetamine
in Mr. Miller's pocket would then have been inevitably discovered in the search
incident to that arrest.
(R., p.77.) (Emphasis added.)
Based on its application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, the district court concluded
that the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of the evidence, and denied Mr. Miller's
motion to suppress. Because it invoked the inevitable discovery doctrine, the district court did
not decide Mr. Miller's claims that the evidence was obtained as the result of an unconstitutional
detention and weapons search, nor did the court decide the State's assertion that the exclusionary
rule should not apply because of the active parole warrant. 5 (R., p.81.)
After the court denied his suppression motion, and pursuant to an agreement with the
State, Mr. Miller conditionally pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and reserved his
right to appeal the district court's decision. (R., p.100; Tr., p.82, Ls.1-23.) The district court
sentenced Mr. Miller to seven years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.109-12.) Mr. Miller timely
appealed. (R., p.113.)

5

The district court mistakenly stated that Mr. Miller's Reply Brief raised a question regarding
the effectiveness of a Fourth Amendment waiver, apparently referring to terms of a parole
supervision agreement. (See R., p.79.) However, neither party raised any issue regarding
Mr. Miller's status or rights as a parolee, nor were the terms of any parole supervision agreement
introduced in this case. (See R., pp.40-50, 53-56; see generally Tr., p.5, L.15 - p.44, L.6.)
Because such issues were not raised by the parties below or actually decided by the district court,
they are not properly before this Court on appeal. See State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 71 7, 721
(2017) (parties are required to present their arguments to the court below), and State v. Duvalt,
131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998) (issues not argued but actually decided by the trial court may be
raised on appeal).
5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Miller's motion to suppress?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Miller's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it failed to suppress the evidence obtained as the result of

Officer Anderson's warrantless weapons pat-search of Mr. Miller. Without deciding whether the
pat-search violated Mr. Miller's constitutional rights, the district court concluded that
suppression was inappropriate because of the inevitable discovery doctrine.

However, the

inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply here under either the hypothetical created by the
district court (that the officer would have discovered the contraband near Mr. Miller, then
arrested and searched him), or the theory that was argued by the State (that police officers would
have discovered Mr. Miller's parole warrant, then arrested and searched him). Moreover, the
State failed to carry its burden of showing that the initial detention and weapons frisk were
constitutionally reasonable.

This Court should therefore reverse the district court's order

denying suppression and vacate Mr. Miller's conviction.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court defers to the district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but

freely reviews whether the facts surrounding the search and seizure satisfy constitutional
requirements. State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 29 (2017).
C.

The Methamphetamine Evidence Was Obtained In Violation Of Mr. Miller's Fourth
Amendment Rights
Mr. Miller's motion to suppress challenged the constitutional reasonableness of his initial

detention and his weapons frisk. (R., p. 77; Tr., p.35, L.1 - p.36, L.17.) The district court did not
decide these claims. However, because the relevant facts are not in dispute, and because this
7

Court freely reviews the application constitutional standards, this Court should decide, as a
matter oflaw, that Officer Anderson's conduct violated Mr. Miller's Fourth Amendment rights.

1.

Officer Anderson's Initial Suspicionless Detention Of Mr. Miller Violated
Mr. Miller's Constitutional Rights

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures." U.S. Const. amend IV. When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds
that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the State carries the burden of
proving that the search or seizure in question was reasonable. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,
810 (2009).
The Fourth Amendment permits limited investigatory detentions, based on less than
probable cause, when justified by an officer's reasonable articulable suspicion that a person has
committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); State v. Bishop,
146 Idaho at 810. Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the
rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; Bishop, 146 Idaho
at 810. Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or "inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 810. Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is
evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at or before the time of
the stop. Id.
In this case, Officer Anderson saw that the mother was safe but he went upstairs to verify
the wellbeing of the child, in light of mother's earlier threats to hang him. (R., p.73.) The
Officer Anderson walked into the bedroom to investigate a shadow that made him think there
might be a body swinging in the second bedroom, but instead he found Mr. Miller, sitting calmly

8

in the middle of the couch. (R., p.74; Tr., p.14, Ls.1-4.) The officer was "surprised" to see an
adult male, and he was surprised by Mr. Miller's disinterested response to the commotion.
(R., p.74; Tr., p.23, Ls.13-17.) However, Officer Anderson had no information that Mr. Miller
was connected with the woman's threats, texted to her family member, that the police were
investigating. (Tr., p.16, Ls.5-8.) Because Officer Anderson's attention was focused exclusively
on Mr. Miller, and because he did not observe the apparent drug contraband in the room, Officer
Anderson's information and observations did not provide a factual basis for suspecting
Mr. Miller of criminal activity. (See R., pp.74, 80.)
Rather, Officer Anderson testified that he detained Mr. Miller because he did not know
who Mr. Miller was or why he was in the home; because he did not know if Mr. Miller was
involved with the threats that had been made by the woman, and because he did not know that
the child had been located. (Tr., p.16, Ls.5-8.) These facts did not provide Officer Anderson
with reasonable suspicion to justify the initial detention of Mr. Miller as an investigatory
detention under Terry and its progeny. 6

2.

Officer Anderson's
Constitutional Rights

Suspicionless

6

Weapons

Frisk

Violated

Mr. Miller's

Nor can Mr. Miller's detention be justified under Michigan v. Summers' categorical rule, which
authorizes officers executing a search warrant to detain the occupants of the premises, even
absent individualized suspicion. 452 U.S. 692, 704 (1981). In deciding Summers, the United
States Supreme Court emphasized the significance of the judicial warrant and "the interposition
of the magistrate's determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen."
Id. at 704. The Summers rule has not been extended by the United States Supreme Court or the
Idaho Supreme Court to authorize suspicionless detentions of occupants outside of the confines
of the execution of a warrant. See also Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013), (holding
that the Summers rule is spatially constrained and limited to the search premises authorized by
the warrant.) In Mr. Miller's case, there was no judicial warrant authorizing the police to search
the residence. Absent the prophylaxis of the warrant required by Summers, Mr. Miller's initial
detention by Officer Anderson was constitutionally unreasonable.

9

A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant
requirement exists. Downing, 163 Idaho at 30. One such exception allows an officer to conduct
a limited self-protective pat down search of a detainee in order to remove any weapons. Id.
Absent a warrant, “a frisk for weapons is only justified when, at the moment of
the frisk, the officer has reason to believe that the individual he or she is
investigating is ‘armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others’ and
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter dispels the officer's belief.”
Id. at 30 (quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 818 (2009)) (emphasis added).
“The test is an objective one that asks whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a
reasonably prudent person would be justified in concluding that the individual posed a risk
of danger.” Bishop, at 818. “To satisfy this standard, the officer must indicate ‘specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,’ in light of his or
her experience, justify the officer’s suspicion that the individual was armed and dangerous.”
Bishop, at 888-89 (quoting State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660 (2006) and Terry, 392 U.S. at
21).
In this case, “at the moment of the frisk,” Officer Anderson had no knowledge that
Mr. Miller was armed (Tr., p.14, Ls.14-15), nor had he yet felt the folded knife in Mr. Miller’s
front pocket (Tr., p.16, Ls.9-14; p.25, Ls.10-22; Ex.02:20-30.) Rather, Officer Anderson
testified that he “immediately searched him for possible weapons” because “[i]t’s standard
procedure that even though somebody is in handcuffs, they still need to be searched, because
weapons are still accessible.” (Tr., p.15, Ls.11-18 (emphasis added.)). However, “standard
procedure” cannot supplant the constitutional requirement that the officer possess objective facts
to support an individualized suspicion that the person is “presently armed and dangerous.” See

10

Bishop, at 888-89. 7 In his attempt to justify the weapons frisk, Officer Anderson articulated no
such objective facts - nor would the record support such fact - that, under an objective analysis,
would justify a reasonable suspicion or belief that Mr. Miller was armed and dangerous.
In Bishop, the Idaho Supreme Court set forth eight non-exclusive factors, gleaned from
Terry and its progeny8 that influence whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would
conclude that a particular individual was armed and dangerous:
[1] whether there were any bulges in the suspect's clothing that resembled
a weapon; [2] whether the encounter took place late at night or in a high crime
area; and [3] whether the individual made threatening or furtive movements, [4]
indicated that he or she possessed a weapon, [5] appeared nervous or agitated, [6]
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs, [7] was unwilling to
cooperate, [8] or had a reputation for being dangerous.

146 Idaho at 819.
None of these factors is present in this case. There is no indication that Officer Anderson
saw a bulge resembling a weapon in Mr. Miller's clothing, and it was only after Officer Miller
felt the folded knife in Mr. Miller's front pocket - that is, after the officer initiated the pat search
- that Mr. Miller confirmed he had a knife. (See Ex.02:25-40.) There also is no evidence the
officer had observed Mr. Miller making threatening movements, or appearing nervous, agitated,
or under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and Officer Anderson testified he had no information

7

This "standard procedure" of Boise Police Officer's appears in the recent, but not final,
Supreme Court Opinion in State v. Saldivar, 2019 WL 2365047, at *3 (June 5, 2019) not
released for publication as of yet published). The Court expressed concern police officers
replacing the constitutional "armed and dangerous" standard with the "standard operating
procedure of frisking everyone they detain." See State v. Saldivar, 2019 WL 236504 7
(unpublished).
8
The Court cited the following: Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979); Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112 (1977); State v. Henage, 143 Idaho at 661-62; State v.
Davenport, 144 Idaho 99, 103 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Holler, 136 Idaho 287, 292
(Ct. App. 2001); State v. Babb, 133 Idaho 890, 893 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Simmons, 120 Idaho
672, 677 (Ct. App. 1991).
11

that Mr. Miller was using controlled substances. (Tr., p.14, Ls.16-18.). Nor is there evidence the
officer was aware Mr. Miller had a reputation for being dangerous.
Additionally, Mr. Miller had been cooperative with Officer Anderson and willingly
obeyed the officer's commands: Mr. Miller stood up promptly and put his hands behind his back,
just as the officer had ordered, and he allowed Officer Anderson to place him in handcuffs,
without belligerence or physical resistance. (See Ex.02:02-30.) While it is true, as noted by the
district court (R., p.71), that Mr. Miller denied Officer Anderson's request for permission to
reach inside his pockets, and refused to provide his name to the police, Officer Anderson's
bodycam video makes clear that the officer's requests and Mr. Miller's refusals came only after
Officer Anderson initiated the weapons pat search. 9 (See Ex.02:02-30.)
It is clear that Officer Anderson began his weapons pat search before he asked Mr. Miller
for permission to search, and before Mr. Miller was asked to identify himself

Thus,

Mr. Miller's refusals - even if indicative of an unwillingness to cooperate within the meaning of
the seventh Bishop factor - are irrelevant to a determination of whether Officer Anderson was
justified in patting him for weapons.
The only other explanation Officer Anderson provided to justify his conduct was that he
did not know who Mr. Miller was or why he was in the home, did not know whether he was
involved with the threats that were texted by the woman, and that he did not know that the child

9

As demonstrated in the video, beginning from the time Officer Anderson entered the room, to
the time he reached Mr. Miller's pockets, Officer Anderson's statements to Mr. Miller were:
"You're not a child-what's going on? "and then, "Here, put your hands behind your back-put
your hands behind your back. You're a detainee right now. What is going on?" (02:02-20.)
Officer Anderson's very next words were, "You have anything on you? What's this? What is it?
Can I take it out? I don't want to get cut. What is it? A knife?" [inaudible, by Mr. Miller]
"Then I'm taking your weapons off you." (02:20-30.) (Emphasis added.) The video also shows
that it was much later, and after Mr. Miller was arrested and handed over to the other officers,
that Mr. Miller was asked his name and refused to provide it. (Ex.02:55-3:15.)
12

had been located. (Tr., p.16, Ls.5-8.) However, as noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v.
Downing, "Terry and its progeny require more than general unease or confusion, however, else

law enforcement could conduct frisks in nearly every encounter with the public." 163 Idaho 26,
30 (2017). Officer Anderson's concerns and uncertainty did not justify a weapons frisk because
they did not indicate Mr. Miller to be armed and dangerous. Accordingly, Officer Anderson's
conduct in patting Mr. Miller for weapons cannot be justified as a weapons frisk under Terry and
its progeny.
D.

The District Court Erred By Invoking The "Inevitable Discovery Doctrine" To Deny
Suppression
Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the exclusionary

rule, which requires all evidence obtained as a direct or indirect result of the illegal search or
seizure, i.e., the "fruit of the poisonous tree," to be excluded. E.g., Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963); State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 30 (2017). However, under the
inevitable discovery doctrine, if the State shows that unlawfully obtained evidence "ultimately
or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means" the evidence may be admitted.
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984); Downing, 163 Idaho at 30.

The "inevitable discovery doctrine" does not apply in this case because that doctrine only
saves the fruits of an unlawful action when the State shows that those fruits "ultimately or
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means." State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31
(2017) (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 444). The exception does not apply just because the evidence
could

have

been

discovered

had

the

same

officer

acted

unlawfully. State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 787 (Ct. App. 2015).
As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in Downing,

13

lawfully

instead

of

The inevitable discovery exception does not permit us to speculate on the course
of action the investigation could have taken in the absence of ... an unlawful patsearch, and subsequently tainted admissions-even if that alternate course likely
would have yielded the evidence. The doctrine must presuppose [ 1] inevitable
hypotheticals [2] running in parallel to the illegal actions, not in series flowing
directly from the officers' unlawful conduct. As our Court of Appeals has stated,
"The inevitable discovery doctrine 'is not intended to swallow the exclusionary
rule whole by substituting what the police should have done for what they really
did."
163 Idaho at 32 (citing State v. Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 392 (Ct. App. 1985)) (emphasis added).
Thus, in order to correctly apply the inevitable discovery doctrine, the court must presuppose a
hypothetical that both [1] is inevitable and [2] runs parallel to the officer's illegal actions.
Two separate theories for invoking the inevitable discovery doctrine are at play in this
case:

First, the theory that Mr. Miller would inevitably have been arrested for the drug

contraband lying on the bed in plain view, and the methamphetamine would have been
discovered in the search incident to that arrest, which is the basis of the district court's decision.
(R., pp.77-81.) Second, the theory that Mr. Miller's arrest on the parole warrant was inevitable,
and the methamphetamine would have been discovered during the search incident to that arrest,
which was the theory argued by the State, below. (R., pp.51-53.) Neither theory is supported by
a correct application of the doctrine to the facts of this case.

1.

The District Court's Theory For Invoking The Doctrine Is Erroneous

The district court found that there was drug contraband lying on the bed in plain view,
and found that Mr. Miller's presence in the room had "consumed" Officer Anderson's attention
and had prevented the officer from seeing it until after Mr. Anderson was removed from the
room. (R., pp.74, 80.) After making these findings, the district court engaged in the following
hypothetical fact-finding:
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If Mr. Miller had not been there, Officer Anderson would have conducted a
similar scan of the room that [he] conducted in the few second[s] after Mr. Miller
was taken away, and discovered the paraphernalia.
…
If Officer Anderson had not handcuffed Mr. Miller and if Officer Anderson had
not frisked Mr. Miller and discovered the methamphetamine, in Mr. Miller’s
pocket, Officer Anderson would inevitably have arrested Mr. Miller when Officer
Anderson identified the contraband near where Mr. Miller had been. The
methamphetamine in Mr. Miller’s pocket would then have been inevitably
discovered in the search incident to that arrest.
(R., p.77.) (Emphasis added.)
However, the district court’s speculation that, “If Mr. Miller had not been there …” is not
an appropriate hypothetical because it was not inevitable. Mr. Miller not being in the room was
not an inevitable hypothetical, since (1) Mr. Miller in fact was in the room when Officer Miller
entered it, (2) Mr. Miller was removed from the room as the result of Officer Anderson’s
unlawful search and arrest, (3) there is no basis for concluding Mr. Miller would have left the
room but-for the unlawful search and arrest, and (4) regardless of whether Mr. Miller stayed in
the room or left it, it is a matter for speculation whether Officer Anderson would have stayed in
the room or returned to the room, especially since Officer Anderson’s stated reason for going
into the room – the shadow showing movement in the room – was resolved, and he observed no
other facts indicating that the child he was searching for was present in the room.
On this latter point, the district court concluded that, because Officer Anderson was not
yet aware the child had been located when he arrested Mr. Miller, it would be within the scope of
exigency to continue to search for the child. (R., p.81.) This conclusion, however, does not
mean the officer’s continued presence in that room was inevitable, nor that he would have
inevitably seen the drug paraphernalia. Officer Anderson never testified that he was looking for
the child when he scanned the room, and his conduct toward Mr. Miller shows the officer’s
attention could be drawn to other law enforcement interests, unrelated to locating the child. As
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observed by the Supreme Court in Downing, courts do not invoke the inevitable discovery
doctrine “by substituting what the police should have done for what they really did.” 163 Idaho
at 32. The district court in this case did exactly what the Court in Downing said courts could not
do: the district court substituted what Officer Anderson could have done – conduct a visual scan
of the room without being overly distracted by Mr. Miller’s presence and observe the
paraphernalia located in plain view (R., p.80) – for what the officer actually did, which was to
focus on Mr. Miller exclusively, to unlawfully search him, arrest him, and hand him over to other
officers. The fact is, Officer Anderson did not see the drug paraphernalia until after he had
searched and arrested Mr. Miller, and then returned to the room to further examine the room.
As noted above, Mr. Miller was sitting calmly on the couch when Officer Anderson
entered the room, and there is no evidence to suggest Mr. Miller would inevitably have left or
been removed from the bedroom – and hence, relieving Officer Anderson from his “tunnel
vision” – had he not been searched and arrested. Even assuming Mr. Miller, at some time, would
have left the bedroom, it is speculative, and certainly not inevitable, that Mr. Miller would have
left before Officer Anderson realized that the child had been located, that is, before the police
officers’ warrantless authority to search the room ended. As noted by the district court, a search
that is authorized by exigent circumstances, as in this case, is limited by the exigency. (R., p.81,
citing State v. Rusho, 110 Idaho 556, 559 (Ct. App. 1989)); see also State v. Franklin, 160 Idaho
860, 864 (Ct. App. 2016) (“A warrantless search under the exigent circumstance exception must
be strictly circumscribed by the nature of the exigency that justifies the intrusion.”).
What course of action Officer Anderson would have taken, had he not searched and
arrested Mr. Miller, is a matter of speculation. The district court’s hypothesized scenario, while
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a possible hypothetical, is not an inevitable hypothetical.

Because it is not inevitable, the

doctrine of inevitable discovery does not prevent suppression of the evidence.
2.

The State's Theory, That Mr. Miller Would Inevitably Have Been Arrested On
The Parole Warrant, Is Unavailing And Should Be Rejected

The State's theory for invoking the inevitable discovery doctrine is based on the
hypothetical that the police officers would inevitably have arrested Mr. Miller on the active
parole warrant. Although not decided by the district court, this theory is properly before this
Court on appeal. See State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017) (holding that respondents on
appeal are limited to the theories they argued in the trial court.)
In its brief in opposition to Mr. Miller's motion, the State argued that,
[O]nce law enforcement learned Mr. Miller's identity, they would have been
obligated to arrest him due to an active parole warrant. For this reason, the
methamphetamine in his pocket would have certainly been discovered as part of a
search incident to arrest or inventory search once Mr. Miller was in custody.
(R., p.52.)
The State's argument fails, however, because it requires the hypothetical finding that law
enforcement would inevitably have learned Mr. Miller's identity, in the absence of the unlawful
search and arrest. However, the State did not show that the police would have come to learn
Mr. Miller's identity, had he not been handed over for arrest. To the contrary, the district court
found, and the record supports, that Officer Anderson did not know Mr. Miller and that
Mr. Miller had been was unwilling to provide his identity in response to police questioning.
(R., p.71; Tr., p.19, Ls.3-5; Ex.02:55-3:15.) The record shows that, upon his arrest upstairs by
Officer Anderson, Mr. Miller was handed over to Officer Major and was asked to provide his
name, but Mr. Miller refused. (Ex.02:55-3: 15.) Mr. Miller was then taken downstairs, out to the
awaiting police cars. (Tr., p.18, L.21-p.20, L.9.) The officers at the scene continued to look for
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evidence of Mr. Miller’s identity, unsuccessfully, at one point finding some other person’s name
in the bedroom and running it through dispatch. (Ex.0:5:05-18.) Officer Anderson testified that
Officer Major was ultimately able to obtain Mr. Miller’s name, some fourteen minutes later.
(Tr., p.18, L.21– p.20, L.9.) However, the State presented no evidence indicating how and where
this was accomplished, and whether the police could or would have discovered the name, had
they not arrested Mr. Miller. (See generally Tr., p.5, L.15 – p.44, L.6.)
Given Mr. Miller’s unwillingness to provide his identity, and the lack of information as to
how it was ultimately obtained by the officer processing him for arrest, the State cannot establish
the police would inevitably have obtained Mr. Miller’s name, had he not been an arrestee, and
therefore cannot show that the police would inevitably have discovered the parole warrant.
Accordingly, the State’s argument, raised below, provides no basis for this Court to affirm the
district court’s order. Therefore, the district court’s conclusion that the inevitable discovery
doctrine applies to prevent suppression should be reversed.
As demonstrated above, Officer Anderson conducted a warrantless detention and
weapons pat search of Mr. Miller, and the State has failed to carry its burden of showing the
detention and search were constitutionally justified. Therefore, this Court should conclude, as a
matter of law, that Officer Anderson’s conduct in detaining and searching Mr. Miller violated the
Fourth Amendment, and all fruit of the unlawful conduct, including the methamphetamine
discovered in Mr. Miller’s pocket, was subject to the exclusionary rule and should have been
suppressed.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Miller respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying
suppression, vacate his conviction, and remand his case to the district court to allow him to
withdraw his guilty plea as provided by the terms of his plea agreement.
DATED this 21 st day of June, 2019.
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